Network Time Security for the Network Time Protocol
draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp-26

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Document Type Active Internet-Draft (ntp WG)
Authors Daniel Franke  , Dieter Sibold  , Kristof Teichel  , Marcus Dansarie  , Ragnar Sundblad 
Last updated 2020-03-22 (latest revision 2020-03-19)
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IANA expert review comments TLS expert expects "recommended" field for TLS Exporter Label to be changed back to "Y" after version 24.
NTP Working Group                                              D. Franke
Internet-Draft                                                    Akamai
Intended status: Standards Track                               D. Sibold
Expires: September 23, 2020                                   K. Teichel
                                                                     PTB
                                                             M. Dansarie

                                                             R. Sundblad
                                                                  Netnod
                                                          March 22, 2020

          Network Time Security for the Network Time Protocol
                  draft-ietf-ntp-using-nts-for-ntp-26

Abstract

   This memo specifies Network Time Security (NTS), a mechanism for
   using Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Authenticated Encryption
   with Associated Data (AEAD) to provide cryptographic security for the
   client-server mode of the Network Time Protocol (NTP).

   NTS is structured as a suite of two loosely coupled sub-protocols.
   The first (NTS-KE) handles initial authentication and key
   establishment over TLS.  The second handles encryption and
   authentication during NTP time synchronization via extension fields
   in the NTP packets, and holds all required state only on the client
   via opaque cookies.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 23, 2020.

Franke, et al.         Expires September 23, 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                   NTS4NTP                      March 2020

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.1.  Objectives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.2.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  TLS profile for Network Time Security . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  The NTS Key Establishment Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  NTS-KE Record Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.1.  End of Message  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.1.2.  NTS Next Protocol Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.1.3.  Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.1.4.  Warning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.1.5.  AEAD Algorithm Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.1.6.  New Cookie for NTPv4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.1.7.  NTPv4 Server Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.1.8.  NTPv4 Port Negotiation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.2.  Key Extraction (generally)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   5.  NTS Extension Fields for NTPv4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.1.  Key Extraction (for NTPv4)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.2.  Packet Structure Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     5.3.  The Unique Identifier Extension Field . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.4.  The NTS Cookie Extension Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.5.  The NTS Cookie Placeholder Extension Field  . . . . . . .  17
     5.6.  The NTS Authenticator and Encrypted Extension Fields
           Extension Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.7.  Protocol Details  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   6.  Suggested Format for NTS Cookies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     7.1.  Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry   25
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